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Technological progress is an important factor for development and growth of an 
economy. An economy can increase her technological capability through several ways. 
Two dominant ways to increase technological capability are indigenous research and 
development (R&D) and technology licensing.  
Researchers working on industrial organization and international economics 
have already analyzed several issues on R&D investments and optimal R&D 
organizations in oligopolistic industries (see, e.g. Reinganum, 1983, d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988, Marjit, 1991, Combs, 1992, Suzumura, 1992, Choi, 1993, Beath et al., 
1998,  Poyago-Theotoky, 1998 and Kabiraj and Mukherjee, 2000). It has been found 
that knowledge spillover and uncertainty in R&D are two major concerns to the firms 
doing R&D. While the strategy on R&D investment may help firms to overcome the 
problem of uncertainty, patent policy can influence knowledge spillover. However, the 
above papers did not pay attention to examine the role of different patent policies on the 
incentives for R&D and social welfare. 
There is another literature examining the effects of different patent systems on 
R&D (see, e.g. Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990, Klemperer, 1990, Gallini, 1992 and 
Mukherjee and Pennings, 2001).  But, these papers ignored the possibility of R&D by 
all the firms in the industry and concentrated on a pre-defined sequence of R&D. 
However, the above-mentioned two sets of papers share a common feature, viz., these 
papers more or less ignored the possibility of other business strategies such as 
technology licensing while analyzing R&D decisions.
1 Hence, while the possibility of 
tacit knowledge or higher cost associated with licensing can justify the previous works, 
those works are not completely relevant in those industries where licensing is not 
difficult. The present paper starts off with this background and examines the 
implications of different patent systems on R&D investment and social welfare with and 
without the possibility of licensing ex-post R&D. 
  In what follows, section 2 considers a duopoly model of R&D competition under 
different patent systems. For simplicity, we consider two different patent systems called 
weak and strong patent protections. We assume that knowledge spillover is possible 
only under weak patent protection.
2 We show that whether strong patent protection 
increases R&D investment of all firms compared to weak patent protection is 
ambiguous. If R&D functions of these firms are sufficiently asymmetric then strong 
patent protection can increase R&D investment of one firm but can reduce R&D 
                                                       
1 In a model of R&D competition with no uncertainty in R&D, Kultti and Takalo (1998) looked at the 
possibility of cross licensing ex-post R&D.  
2 It is well known that patents do not always prevent spillover of the research results (see, e.g., Levin et 
al., 1987). Further, the efficiency of a patent system depends on the nature of industries. Though, for 
simplicity, we assume that strong patent protection does not encourage knowledge spillover, our 
qualitative results will hold as long as one assumes higher knowledge spillover under weak patent 
protection compared to strong patent protection.    2
investment of the other firm. But, for more symmetric firms, R&D investment of both 
firms is higher under strong patent protection compared to weak patent protection. 
However, there will be no influence on R&D investment if, in case of unilateral success 
in R&D, the successful firm becomes the monopoly even under weak patent protection. 
Using a cross-country analysis with aggregative R&D data Varsakelis (2001) has shown 
that countries with a strong patent protection invest more in R&D. Hence, the present 
paper asks for firm level analysis and provides a testable hypothesis regarding the 
influence of different patent systems on R&D investment of individual firms.
3 
We show that the existence of uncertainty in R&D can lead to a conflict between 
ex-ante and ex-post social welfare. If cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small or 
the degree of knowledge spillover is sufficiently large then ex-post welfare will be more 
under weak patent protection. But, for sufficiently large cost reduction and for 
sufficiently low knowledge spillover, ex-post welfare will be more under strong patent 
protection. However, as probability of innovation increases under strong patent 
protection, the ex-ante welfare is likely to be higher under strong patent protection when 
the effect of R&D investment on the probability of success is sufficiently strong. 
The possibility of licensing ex-post R&D may encourage the firms to engage in 
technology licensing. We consider this possibility in sections 3 and 4 by incorporating 
the possibility of fixed-fee licensing and licensing with per-unit output royalty, 
respectively. With fixed-fee licensing we show that licensing is more likely to occur 
under weak patent protection. The possibility of fixed-fee licensing is likely to increase 
the difference of total R&D investment between these patent systems when licensing is 
privately profitable under both patent systems. But, if licensing is profitable only under 
weak patent protection then the difference of total R&D investment reduces between 
these patent systems. However, when licensing is profitable under both patent systems 
then by creating ex-post welfare likely to be higher under weak patent protection and ex-
ante welfare likely to be higher under strong patent protection, the possibility of 
licensing may increase the policy dilemma. If licensing is profitable under weak patent 
protection only then both ex-ante and ex-post welfare are likely to be higher under weak 
patent protection. 
If licensing consists of per-unit output royalty then royalty income will be higher 
under weak patent protection when cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently large. 
Therefore, unlike fixed-fee licensing, licensing contract with per-unit output royalty can 
have higher impact on R&D investment under weak patent protection than strong patent 
protection. The analysis on welfare shows that, unlike fixed-fee licensing contract, ex-
ante welfare is likely to be higher under weak patent protection when cost reduction 
from R&D is not sufficiently low. Thus, this paper shows the importance of the type of 
licensing contract for our results.       
                                                       
3 A recent overview on the benefits and costs of patent protection is given by Mazzoleni and Nelson 
(1998).  3
This paper can be related to the literature on licensing also (see, e.g. Rockett, 
1990, Marjit, 1990, Kabiraj and Marjit, 1993, Mukherjee, 2001). One common feature 
of these papers on licensing is the absence of R&D process in their framework. Contrary 
to this, the present paper considers the dynamic effect of R&D and technology 
licensing.
4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we consider 
a two-stage game of R&D competition in section 2. Section 3 extends this two-stage 
game to a three-stage game by incorporating the possibility of a licensing contract ex-
post R&D. In this section we concentrate on fixed-fee licensing contract. Then we 
examine the implication of a licensing contract with per-unit output royalty in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. Proofs are relegated to the appendix. 
 
2 A two-stage game of R&D competition 
 
Consider that there are two firms, say 1 and 2, in the industry competing for an 
innovation. Suppose the firms have a technology that corresponds to a constant average 
cost of production  0 > c  and they are trying to invent a technology that corresponds to a 
constant average cost of production c, where  0 ≥ > c c . However, the success in R&D 
is probabilistic and the unconditional probability of success in R&D,  ) ( i i x p ,  2 , 1 = i , 
increases with R&D investment, where  i x  is firm i’s R&D investment. We consider 
that  0 ) ( > ′
i i x p ,  0 ) ( < ″
i i x p ,  ∞ = ′ ) 0 ( i p  and  0 ) ( = ∞ ′
i p  for  2 , 1 = i . So, we allow for 
the difference in probability functions between these firms. However, for simplicity we 
consider that if the two probability functions are different, there is no possibility of 
crossing of these functions. Without loss of generality, we consider that for same R&D 
investment probability of success in R&D for firm 1 is at least as good as that of for 
firm 2, i.e.,  ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 x p x p ≥  for  2 1 x x =  and  0 > i x ,  2 , 1 = i .     
  Uncertainty in the R&D process can lead to unilateral success in R&D and 
generates technological difference ex-post R&D. We assume that knowledge spillover 
helps to reduce the cost of production of the unsuccessful firm in case of technological 
difference. Therefore, if both firms succeed or fail in R&D then there is no possibility of 
knowledge spillover. However, knowledge spillover depends on the type of patent 
protection of the economy. In the following analysis we will consider to different patent 
protections – (i) weak patent protection and (ii) strong patent protection. A relatively 
strong patent protection reduces knowledge spillover between the firms.  For simplicity, 
here we assume that knowledge spillover is possible only under weak patent protection. 
Hence, in case of unilateral success in R&D, the effective constant average cost of 
                                                       
4 In totally different context and framework Gallini and Winter (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) focus 
on the effect of licensing on R&D. While Gallini and Winter (1985) identify the conditions for licensing 
in a search-theoretic model of R&D, Katz and Shapiro (1985) focus on the incentives to develop a process 
when there is a possibility of licensing by the patent holder to its competitor.      4
production of the unsuccessful firm is given by  c α  with  ] 1 , [
c
c ∈ α , where α  shows the 
degree of knowledge spillover. While 
c
c = α  implies perfect knowledge spillover,  1 = α  
implies no knowledge spillover. Therefore, strong patent protection implies  1 = α . 
We assume that the inverse market demand function is given by 
 
q a P − = ,                                    (1) 
 
where the notations have usual meaning with  c a > .    
 
2.1 Weak patent protection 
 
First, consider optimal R&D investments under weak patent protection. Here, the firms 
experience a knowledge spillover in case of unilateral success in R&D and the effective 
cost of the unsuccessful firm is given by  c α . Therefore, the net expected profit of the 
ith firm are  
 
, ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( i i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i x c c x p x p c x p x p c c x p x p − − − + − + π π π   
for   
2
) ( c a
c
+
≥ α                                 (2) 
and 
 
) , ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i α π α π π − + − +
i i j j i i x c c x p x p − − − + ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( π ,  for  
2
) ( c a
c
+
≤ α ,             (3) 
 
where  2 , 1 , = j i ,  j i ≠ , the first and second argument of the π  function show the 
marginal cost of ith and  j th firm respectively and   ) (c i π  shows the monopoly profit of 
firm i. 
   The maximization of (2) and (3) with respect to  i x  gives us the following first 
order conditions respectively 
 
1 ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( = − ′ − − ′ + ′ c c x p x p c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i π π π ,  
for   
2
) ( c a
c
+
≥ α                                         (4) 
and 
  5
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i α π α π π ′ − − ′ + ′
  1 ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( = − ′ − c c x p x p i j i i π ,  for 
2
) ( c a
c
+
≤ α .          (5) 
 
It is easy to check that the second order conditions for maximization are 
satisfied. Equation (4) and (5) implicitly define firm i’s reaction functions  ) (
*
j i x x , 
where  2 , 1 , = j i  and  j i ≠ . These reaction functions show the profit maximizing levels 
of  i x  given  j x . Solving these reaction functions, we get the optimal R&D investments 
for these firms. We consider that the probability functions are such that we get unique 
equilibrium for R&D investment.  
 
Proposition 1: (a) The reaction functions are negatively sloped and the absolute slope 
of the reaction functions is less than 1. 
(b) If R&D productivity
5 of firm i is more than firm  j ,  2 , 1 , = j i  and  j i ≠  (i.e., 
′ > ′
j i p p ) then equilibrium R&D investment of firm i is more than firm  j . The 
equilibrium probability of success in R&D is also higher for firm i than firm  j , i.e., 
j i p p >  in equilibrium.   
 
Proof: See Appendix A for the proof.                 Q.E.D. 
 
 
2.2 Strong patent protection 
 
Now, we consider the R&D game under strong patent protection where knowledge 
spillover is not possible. Therefore, here the net expected profits of the ith firm are 
given by 
 
) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i π π π − − + − +   
  i x − ,   for 
2
) ( c a
c
+
≥                                         (6) 
and 
) , ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i π π π − + − +
  i i j j i i x c c x p x p − − − + ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( π , for  
2
) ( c a
c
+
≤ ,           (7) 
where  2 , 1 , = j i ,  j i ≠ . Maximizing (6) and (7) we get the respective first order 
conditions for optimal R&D investment of the ith firm,  2 , 1 = i :  
                                                       
5 Here by R&D productivity we mean the effect of R&D investment on the probability of success. Hence, 
higher productivity implies that same R&D investment can lead to higher probability of success in R&D.  6
 
1 ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( = − ′ − − ′ + ′ c c x p x p c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i π π π , 
for 
2
) ( c a
c
+
≥                                            (8) 
and 
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p i j j i i i j j i i i j j i i π π π ′ − − ′ + ′
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2
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c
+
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Second order conditions for maximization are satisfied. Further, we can have the finding 
similar to Proposition 1 even for strong patent protection.  
 
2.3 Comparison between weak and strong patent protections 
2.3.1 Effect on R&D investments 
 
It is clear that if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently large and knowledge spillover 
is sufficiently small then in case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm 
becomes a monopoly under both patent systems (see (4) and (8)). Hence, here patent 
protections do not have any influence on the R&D investments of these firms. 
  Now, consider the situation where in case of unilateral success in R&D, the 
unsuccessful firm can compete in the market under both weak and strong patent 
protections. Therefore, here (5) and (9) are the relevant first order conditions for optimal 
R&D investments. From these expressions we see that, given  j x , firm i will invest 
more in R&D under strong patent protection than weak patent protection. Therefore, the 
reaction function functions for both the firms will shift outward under strong patent 
protection compared to weak patent protection. However, whether the equilibrium R&D 
investment of both firms will be higher under strong patent protection compared to 
weak patent protection depends on the relationship between the probability of success in 
R&D and R&D investment. The outward movement of a firm’s reaction function will 
be more when the marginal profitability of her R&D investment reduces slowly. 
Therefore, if a firm’s incremental gain from higher R&D investment is more then it 
gives that firm higher incentive for R&D investment. So, if the probability functions of 
these firms differ significantly then it is more likely that the equilibrium R&D 
investment of one firm (other firm) will be more (less) under strong patent protection 
compared to weak patent protection. But, for firms with more symmetric R&D 
productivity, the similar outward movement of both the reaction functions will lead to 
higher R&D investment by both firms under strong patent protection. 
Figure 1 shows the effect of different patent systems on the reaction functions 
for R&D investments with  2
) ( c a c
+ < . The figure shows firm 1’s and 2’s reaction 
functions as  NN  and HH  respectively under weak patent protection and Y  shows the  7
equilibrium R&D investments. Strong patent protection shifts the reaction functions of 
both firms towards right. If new equilibrium of R&D investments does not occur in the 
range  XYZ  then one firm’s R&D investment increases under strong patent protection 
while the other firm’s R&D investment decreases under strong patent protection. In this 
figure we show that MM  and GG are the reaction functions of firm 1 and 2 
respectively under strong patent protection. Therefore, new equilibrium is at K  and firm 
1’s (firm 2’s) equilibrium R&D is more (less) under strong patent protection compared 




  If, in case of unilateral success in R&D the unsuccessful firm can compete in the 
market under weak patent protection only then the relevant first order conditions are (5) 
and (8). The comparison of (5) and (8) shows that given the R&D investment of the 
competitor, it is always better for a firm to invest more in R&D under strong patent 
protection compared to weak patent protection. However, like the previous situation, 
whether equilibrium R&D investment of both firms will be more under strong patent 
protection is ambiguous (similar to Figure 1). 
  The following proposition summarizes the above findings. 
 
Proposition 2: (a) If knowledge spillover is not large enough and cost reduction from 
successful R&D is sufficiently large, i.e.,  2
) ( c a c
+ ≥ α , then R&D investments under weak 
and strong patent protections are same.  
(b) If either cost reduction from R&D is not sufficiently large, i.e.,  2
) ( c a c
+ < , or 
knowledge spillover is sufficiently large, i.e.,  2
) ( c a c
+ < α , then R&D investment of at 
least one firm is more under strong patent protection compared to weak patent 
protection.  
 
It has been argued in the literature that strong patent protection increases R&D 
investment in a country (see, e.g. Varsakelis, 2001). But, attention did not paid how 
patent protections can affect R&D investments of individual firms. The above result 
shows that in an economy with sufficient difference in R&D abilities, R&D investment 
of a firm can be less under strong patent protection compared to weak patent protection. 
 
2.3.2 Impact on social welfare     
 
Now, we would like to investigate how it affects social welfare. Here by social welfare 
we mean the summation of industry profit net of R&D investment and consumers 
surplus.  We will show that the existence of uncertainty in R&D may lead to differences 
in ex-ante and ex-post welfare.  8
 
2.3.2.1 Ex-post welfare under weak and strong patent protections   
 
We start our analysis by looking at the ex-post social welfare under both patent regimes. 
If both firms succeed or fail in R&D then both firms’ cost of production will be same 
irrespective of the patent protection. The analysis in subsection 2.3.1 shows that R&D 
investment will change under these patent systems when the unsuccessful firm competes 
at least under weak patent protection in the case of unilateral success in R&D. 
Therefore, given a duopoly market structure under unilateral success in R&D, if both 
firms succeed or fail in R&D, we can say that with higher total R&D investment under 
strong patent protection,
6 ex-post welfare will be higher under weak patent protection 
relative to strong patent protection.
7 
Now, we examine what will happen if there is an unilateral success in R&D. If, 
in case of unilateral success, the successful firm becomes a monopolist under weak and 
strong patent protections then the effective cost of production and R&D investments of 
these firms are same under both patent systems. Hence, here ex-post social welfare 
remains same under these two patent systems. 
Next, consider the situation where under unilateral success in R&D, the 
unsuccessful firm can compete in the market at least under weak patent protection. 
Hence, in this situation, it is clear that the cost asymmetry becomes more under strong 
patent protection than weak patent protection. Given the demand and cost specifications, 
in case of unilateral success in R&D, industry profit in the product market and 
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6 Total R&D investment increases under strong patent protection compared to weak patent protection if 
the absolute slope of the reaction functions for R&D investment is less than 1, which has been satisfied 
for this analysis (Proposition 1(a)).   
7 Ex-post welfare will be same when the successful firm becomes a monopoly in case of unilateral success 
in R&D as in this situation R&D investments will not be influenced by the patent systems.  9
Proposition 3: (a) If in case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm becomes 
a monopoly under weak patent protection then ex-post social welfare is same under 
weak and strong patent protections irrespective of the number of successful firm in 
R&D. 
(b) Suppose that, in case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm cannot be the 
monopoly. Then, if either both firms succeed or neither firm succeeds in R&D, ex-post 
welfare is higher under weak patent protection. 
(c) Suppose, in case of unilateral success in R&D, the unsuccessful firm can compete in 
the product market at least for weak patent protection. (i) Then ex-post welfare is more 
under weak patent protection than that of under strong patent protection when either 
cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small or knowledge spillover is sufficiently 
large. (ii) But for sufficient large cost reduction from R&D and with sufficiently low 
knowledge spillover, ex-post welfare is more under strong patent protection than weak 
patent protection provided the difference between total R&D investments under these 
patent systems is not sufficiently large.      
 
Proof: See Appendix B for the proof.                      Q.E.D. 
 
The result shows that even if weak patent protection induces knowledge 
spillover, social welfare may be more under strong patent protection if the degree of 
knowledge spillover is sufficiently small. Knowledge spillover helps to raise consumer 
surplus by reducing the effective cost of the unsuccessful firm but, at the same time, it 
reduces the profit of the successful firm who has relatively better technology than the 




2.3.2.2 Ex-ante welfare under weak and strong patent protections 
 
While ex-post social welfare depends only on the outcomes of R&D and R&D 
investment, probability of success is also important for ex-ante social welfare. For 
example, lower competition due to relatively higher cost of production of the 
unsuccessful firm under strong patent protection can reduce ex-post welfare under 
strong patent protection compared to weak patent protection. But, sufficiently higher 
R&D investment under strong patent protection can reduce the chance of lower 
competition under strong patent protection significantly and can provide higher ex-ante 
welfare under strong patent protection compared to weak patent protection. 
It is easy to understand that ex-ante welfare is same under these patent systems 
when in case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm becomes monopoly 
                                                       
8 The possibility of welfare of loss due to cost reduction in a Cournot oligopoly has also addressed in 
Lahiri and Ono (1988).   10
under weak patent protection. This is because here R&D investments are same under 
both patent protections. 
Now, consider that even under unilateral success in R&D, the market becomes 
duopoly under weak patent protection. Hence, ex-ante welfare under weak patent 
protection will be 
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But, ex-ante welfare under strong patent protection will be either  
 
) , ( )] ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( 1 )( ( [ ) , ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 c c W x p x p x p x p c c W x p x p W
sp
ep
sp sp sp sp sp
ep
sp sp sp




sp sp x x c c W x p x p 2 1 2 2 1 1 ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( − − − − + , for    2
) ( c a c
+ ≤         (14) 
or, 
 
) ( )] ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( 1 )( ( [ ) , ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 c W x p x p x p x p c c W x p x p W
sp
ep
sp sp sp sp sp
ep
sp sp sp
ea − + − + =  
                         
sp sp sp
ep
sp sp x x c c W x p x p 2 1 2 2 1 1 ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( − − − − + , for   2
) ( c a c
+ ≥         (15) 
 
where  ) (c W
sp
ep  shows ex-post welfare under strong patent protection when only the 
successful firm produces in the market. 
  Consider the following lemma, which will help us in the following analysis. 
 
Lemma 1:  We have (a)  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c c W c c W c c W ep ep ep > > , (b) 
) , ( ) ( ) , ( c c W c W c c W ep ep ep > > , where  2
) 2 ( c a c
+ ≥  and (c)  ) , ( ) , ( c c W c c W ep ep α > . 
  
Proof: The proof is given in the Appendix C.                   Q.E.D. 
 
Now, we are in a position to examine the effects of different patent systems on 
ex-ante welfare. First, consider a situation where in case of unilateral success in R&D, 
the summation of consumer surplus and total profit in the product market is more under 








ep > α ).  Then 
from the expressions  (13) – (15), it is clear that ex-ante welfare can be more under 
strong patent protection than weak patent protection only if the probability of at least 
one success in R&D (i.e.,  ) ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 x p x p x p x p x p x p − + − + = β ), 
which is the summation of both-success in R&D (i.e.,  ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 x p x p = γ ) and only one 
success in R&D (i.e.,  ) ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( 1 )( ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 x p x p x p x p − + − = δ ), increases under  11
strong patent protection. It is easy to check that probability of at least one success 
increases under strong patent protection.
9  
Next, consider the situation where ex-post welfare is more under strong patent 




ep < α ). Since, 
probability of at least one success is higher under strong patent protection, in this 
situation, ex-ante welfare will be more under strong patent protection. 
Now, we see how the analysis will be affected with more asymmetric changes in 
R&D investments. As one firm’s R&D investment increases, say firm 1’s, it reduces the 
R&D investment of the other firm, i.e., firm 2. From Proposition 1 we know that firm 
1’s equilibrium R&D investment is more than firm 2 provided firm 1’s R&D 
productivity is more than that of under firm 2 (i.e.,  ′ > ′
2 1 p p ) and this also implies that 
the equilibrium probability of success is higher for firm 1 than firm 2 (i.e.,  2 1 p p > ). So, 
for higher total R&D investment under strong patent protection, it is clear that more 
asymmetric changes in R&D investments increases the probability of at least one 
success and probability of only one success in R&D. But, whether this will increase also 










, then more asymmetric changes 
in R&D investment under strong patent protection also increases the probability of both-
success. So, if more asymmetric changes in R&D investment does not reduce the 
probability of both-success significantly we can say that it is more likely that more 
asymmetric changes in R&D investment increases the likelihood of higher ex-ante 
welfare under strong patent protection. 
Hence, summarizing the above discussion, we can have the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: (a) Since probability of at least one success increases under strong 
patent protection, it is more likely that ex-ante welfare is higher under strong patent 
protection. If summation of consumer surplus and industry profit in the product market 
is higher under strong patent protection then ex-ante welfare is always higher under 
strong patent protection. 
(b) It is more likely that ex-ante welfare will be higher under strong patent protection 
with more asymmetric changes in R&D investments. 
 
3 A three-stage game of R&D competition and licensing 
 
                                                       
9 We have  2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 )) ( 1 )( ( )) ( 1 )( ( dx x p x p dx x p x p d − ′ + − ′ = β , 
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( dx x p x p dx x p x p d ′ + ′ = γ  and     
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 )) ( 2 1 )( ( )) ( 2 1 )( ( dx x p x p dx x p x p d − ′ + − ′ = δ .  12
In this section we will extend the analysis of the previous section by allowing the 
possibility of licensing ex-post R&D and will examine how the results are influenced 
with this modification. We define a technology by corresponding constant average cost 
of production and lower constant average cost of production implies better technology. 
Technology licensing can take place when there is a difference in technology. 
Hence, like knowledge spillover, we assume that if both firms succeed or fail in R&D 
then there is no possibility of licensing ex-post R&D. In this section, following Katz and 
Shapiro (1985), Marjit (1990), Mukherjee (2001) and many others, we will consider that 
technology licensing takes place against an up-front fixed-fee.
10  Then, in section 4, we 
will briefly consider another popular licensing contract, viz., licensing with per-unit 
output royalty and will examine how the results are affected under this licensing 
contract compared to fixed-fee licensing contract. 
Since technology licensing implies a deliberate knowledge transmission from the 
technologically superior firm to the technologically inferior firm, it is likely that the 
amount of knowledge transmission under licensing could be more than that of under 
knowledge spillover. But, the licenser may decide on the extent of knowledge 
transmission. However, as noted in Rockett (1990), the licenser will either transfer full 
knowledge or will not license at all when licensing consists of up-front fixed-fee. 
Hence, here we consider that in case of licensing complete knowledge transmission will 
take place and hence, ex-post licensing both firms will produce with same technology.  
We consider the following game in this section. In stage one, firm 1 and 2 
simultaneously invest in R&D. Outcome of R&D is realized. Then, in stage two, the 
firms decide whether to do licensing. In our framework, licensing will be an option ex-
post R&D provided only one firm succeeds in R&D. In stage three, these firms compete 
like Cournot duopolists. We solve the game through backward induction. We will 
consider this game under weak and strong patent protections. 
 
3.1 Technology licensing  
 
Since, licensing acts as a deliberate way of sharing information between the firms, we 
have to find out when licensing is profitable. Licensing will be profitable provided 
industry profit under licensing is more than that of under no licensing. 
 
                                                       
10 It is often not possible to monitor a rival firm's output as is necessary to enforce a royalty provision in a 
patent licensing contract. This may be so for purely informational reasons. Alternatively, this can happen 
if after getting the licensed technology, the licensee can imitate or invent around the technology easily and 
produce output with the imitation, thereby avoiding royalty payments. This can be consistent with our 
assumption of weak and strong patent protections if one assumes that strong patent protection eliminates 
knowledge spillover but, does not prevent non-infringing inventing around (see Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  13
Proposition 5: Suppose the licenser and the licensee have constant average cost c and 
c respectively without licensing and both of them have constant average cost c after 
licensing. Then licensing is profitable provided  5
) 3 2 ( c a c
+ < .   
 
Since, this result can be found in Marjit (1990) also, the readers may be referred to 
Marjit (1990) for the proof of this result. The above proposition shows that if the initial 
technologies of these firms are sufficiently close then technology licensing can take 
place. When initial technologies are sufficiently close then, under licensing, the licenser 
does not face much higher competition from the licensee but licensing helps to increase 
cost efficiency in the industry. Hence, the gain from cost reduction in licensee’s firm 
outweighs the loss of profit of the licenser. So, licensing increases industry profit. But, if 
initial technologies are far away then the licenser becomes a near monopoly without 
licensing. In this situation, the loss of profit to the licenser’s firm due to higher 
competition from the licensee outweighs the gain from cost reduction in licensee’s firm. 
Therefore, if initial technologies of these firms are far away then licensing is not 
optimal. 
From Proposition 5 it is clear that licensing will take place under weak patent 
protection whenever  5
) 3 2 ( c a c
+ < α  but licensing can take place under strong patent 
protection when  5
) 3 2 ( c a c
+ < . Therefore, under fixed-fee licensing contract, licensing is 
more likely outcome under weak patent protection than strong patent protection. Though 
it looks slightly paradoxical, the reason is very simple. Weak patent protection induces 
knowledge spillover and hence, reduces the benefit from patent protection. Therefore, 
this increases the incentive for gaining from information sharing through licensing 
compared to a situation where higher benefit from patent protection reduces the gains 
from licensing. Further, this finding provides a testable hypothesis regarding the 
possibility of licensing in an industry with competing licenser and licensee for different 
patent systems. 
The above proposition has looked at the profitability condition for technology 
licensing but did not consider the pricing of the technology. We assume that the price 
for the licensed technology will be decided through a Nash bargaining process. Assume 
that the bargaining power of the licenser is given by β  and the bargaining power of the 
licensee is given by  ) 1 ( β − . Further, we will assume that the bargaining powers of the 
licenser and the licensee are independent of the identity of these firms, i.e., whether firm 
1 or firm 2 acts as licenser or licensee. 
 
Proposition 6: Assume that the bargaining powers of the licenser and the licensee are 
β  and  ) 1 ( β −  respectively. Denote the licensee’s constant average cost of production 
before licensing by  z , where  c z =  under no knowledge spillover and  c z α =  under 
knowledge spillover. Suppose F  shows the price of the technology. If firm i licenses to  14
firm  j , where  2 , 1 , = j i  and  j i ≠  then price of the licensed technology is 
)) , ( ) , ( )( 1 ( )) , ( ) , ( ( c c z c z c c c F i i j j π π β π π β − − + − = .  
 
Proof: See Appendix D for the proof.                   Q.E.D. 
 
From Proposition 6, it is easy to check that license fee increases with large 
difference in initial costs, whenever licensing is optimal. Higher cost of production of 
the licensee reduces the reservation payoff of the licensee, which, in turn, helps the 
licenser to extract more benefit from licensing through higher license fee.   
 
3.2 Effect of licensing on R&D efforts 
 
Since licensing will occur when the effective cost of the unsuccessful firm is greater 
than  5
) 3 2 ( c a+ , the analysis of the section 2 will not be influenced if cost reduction from 
R&D is sufficiently large and the degree of knowledge spillover is sufficiently small. In 
this section we concentrate on those costs and the degree of knowledge spillover such 
that licensing is an optimal decision at least under weak patent protection.  
  Hence, we can have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 7:  (a) Consider that licensing is profitable only under weak patent 
protection. Then the difference in total R&D investment as well as the asymmetry in 
R&D investment under weak and strong patent protection declines with the presence of 
licensing compared to no licensing. 
(b) Consider that licensing is profitable under weak and strong patent systems. Then the 
difference in total R&D investment as well as the asymmetry in R&D investment under 
weak and strong patent protection is likely to increase under licensing compared to no 
licensing. 
 
Proof: Proof of this proposition is given in Appendix E.                 Q.E.D. 
 
From Proposition 6 it is clear that higher bargaining power of the licenser 
increases license fee. Since, there is a positive relationship between the license fee and 
the amount of rightward shift of the reaction functions, higher bargaining power of the 
licenser is likely to create higher asymmetry in equilibrium R&D investments. Higher 
bargaining power increases the gain from licensing and encourages both firms to invest 
more in R&D. But, this will help a firm with more R&D capability to invest more 
aggressively in R&D compared to a firm with low R&D capability. As a result, higher 




3.3 Effect on welfare      
3.3.1 Effect of licensing on ex-post welfare  
 
It is easy to understand that there will be no effect when either both firms succeed in 
R&D or neither firm succeeds in R&D. Further, even under unilateral success in R&D, 
the possibility of licensing may have an impact on ex-post welfare when licensing is a 
profitable option. 
  If licensing is profitable under both patent systems then it will make both firms 
symmetric in the product market. Hence, in this situation, the summation of consumer 
surplus and industry profit in the product market will be same under both patent 
systems. But, higher license fee under strong patent protection will help to increase total 
R&D investment under strong patent protection. So, here ex-post welfare is more under 
weak patent protection. 
  If licensing is profitable only under weak patent protection then the summation 
of consumer surplus and industry profit in the product market is given by  ) , ( c c Wep  and 
) , ( c c Wep  for weak and strong patent protection respectively. Here,  ) , ( ) , ( c c W c c W ep ep >  
(see Lemma 1). Further, it can be checked easily that here total R&D investment is more 
under strong patent protection, we can say that here also ex-post welfare is higher under 
weak patent protection. Hence, the following proposition is immediate.     
 
Proposition 8:  Whenever licensing is privately profitable for at least weak patent 
protection, ex-post welfare is higher under weak patent protection compared to strong 
patent protection.  
 
In Proposition 3, we have seen that for  11
) 7 4 ( c a c
+ >  and for sufficiently low 
knowledge spillover, ex-post welfare becomes more under strong patent protection 
compared to weak patent protection. So, contrary to this, Proposition 9 shows that, in 
this situation, the possibility of licensing can change our qualitative conclusion 
regarding ex-post welfare and can make higher ex-post welfare under weak patent 
protection.  
 
3.3.2 Effect of licensing on ex-ante welfare  
 
First, consider the situation where in case of unilateral success in R&D, licensing is 
profitable under weak and strong patent systems. Hence, in this situation, the summation 
of consumer surplus and industry profit in the product market is same under both patent 
systems. But, higher license fee under strong patent protection will lead to higher total 
R&D investment under strong patent protection. Following the logic of the subsection 
2.3.2.2, we see that here the probability of at least one success increases under strong 
patent protection. Therefore, if the difference in total R&D investment under weak and  16
strong patent protection is not sufficiently large then, in this situation, ex-ante welfare is 
always higher under strong patent protection.  
Now, consider that licensing is privately profitable only under weak patent 
protection. Here licensing will change the expression for ex-ante welfare from (13) to 
the following expression: 
 
) , ( )] ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) ( ) ( [ 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 c c W x p x p x p x p x p x p W
wp
ep
wp wp wp wp wp wp wp
ea − + − + =  
                        
wp wp wp
ep
wp wp x x c c W x p x p 2 1 2 2 1 1 ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( − − − − + .                     (16) 
 
But, ex-ante welfare under strong patent protection is given by (14) or (15). From 
Lemma 1(c) and Proposition 7(a) we find that  ) , ( c c Wep  is greater than  ) , ( c c Wep α  and 
) , ( c c Wep  and the difference in total R&D investment between weak and strong patent 
protection reduces under licensing compared to no licensing. While the former effect 
tends to increase the ex-post welfare under weak patent protection for given probability 
of at least one success, the latter effect reduces the difference between the probability of 
success under weak and strong patent systems. Thus, here it reduces the likelihood of 
higher ex-ante welfare under strong patent protection compared to weak patent 
protection. 
  We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 9: (a) Consider licensing is profitable under both weak and strong patent 
protections. Then ex-ante welfare is always higher under strong patent protection 
compared to weak patent protection when the difference in total R&D investments is not 
sufficiently large between strong and weak patent protections. Hence, here licensing 
increases the likelihood of higher ex-ante welfare under strong patent protection 
compared to a situation with no licensing. 
(b) Consider licensing is profitable only under weak patent protection. Then ex-ante 
welfare is more likely to be higher under weak patent protection under licensing 
relative to no licensing.       
 
Therefore, unlike the effect on ex-post welfare, the effect of licensing on ex-ante 
welfare is ambiguous. If the cost reduction from R&D is not sufficiently higher so that, 
in case of unilateral success in R&D, licensing is a profitable option under both patent 
systems, the possibility of licensing helps to increase the ex-ante welfare under strong 
patent protection. But, the possibility of licensing helps to increase ex-ante welfare 
under weak patent protection when the cost reduction from R&D as well as knowledge 
spillover is sufficiently large. Thus, cost reduction from R&D becomes important to 
determine whether the possibility of licensing increases ex-ante welfare under weak 
patent protection.  
  17
4 Licensing with per-unit output royalty 
 
In this subsection, we will briefly examine the importance of another dominant way of 
licensing, viz., licensing with per-unit output royalty. In fact, without any informational 
problem or the absence of opportunism on the part of the licensee, this could be the 
optimal licensing contract (see, Rockett, 1990 and Mukherjee and Balasubramanian, 
2001).  Further, for simplicity, in this section we will consider that the licenser has full 
bargaining power, which is enough for our purpose. Hence, it is clear that in this 
situation, licensing will be privately profitable for all values of  2
) ( c a c
+ <  and the licenser 
will charge an output royalty  ) ( c z r − =  where  c z α =  under weak patent protection 
and  c z =  under strong patent protection.
11 Hence, licensing does not influence the 
effective cost of production of the licensee but helps the licenser to increase her profit 
through royalty income. 
 
Proposition 10: Royalty income is maximum at  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ = . Effect of licensing with per-
unit output royalty on equilibrium R&D investment will be more under strong patent 
protection if the cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently low (i.e.,  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ < ). But, for 
not so low cost reduction from R&D and not large degree of knowledge spillover (i.e., 
4
) 3 ( c a c
+ > α ) the effect of licensing with per-unit output royalty will be more under weak 
patent protection. Otherwise, it will depend on the cost reduction from R&D and the 
degree of knowledge spillover. 
 
Proof: See Appendix F for the proof.                   Q.E.D. 
 
  As the effective cost of the firms are same under both the patent systems, it is 
clear that the summation of consumer surplus and industry profit in the product market 
except royalty income will be same under licensing and no licensing. The analysis 
without licensing (see subsection 2.3.2.1) shows that ex-post welfare is always higher 
under weak patent protection for  11
) 7 4 ( c a c
+ <  where  11
) 7 4 (
4
) 3 ( c a c a + + < . We know that royalty 
income is more under strong patent protection for  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ < . Hence, for  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ < , 
higher royalty income under strong patent protection reduces the likelihood of higher 
ex-post welfare under weak patent protection compared to a situation with no licensing 
if licensing does not increase sufficiently large asymmetry in total R&D investments 
under these patent systems. 
  If cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently large and the degree of knowledge 
spillover is not sufficiently large then we have seen in subsection 2.3.2.1 that ex-post 
welfare can be higher under strong patent protection. However, royalty income is more 
                                                       
11 This assumes that up-front fixed-fee cannot be negative (see, e.g., Rockett, 1990 and Mukherjee and 
Balasubramanian, 2001).  18
under weak patent protection for  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ > . Hence, for  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ > , higher royalty income 
under weak patent protection reduces the likelihood of higher ex-post welfare under 
strong patent protection compared to a situation with no licensing if licensing does not 
increase sufficiently large asymmetry in total R&D investments under these patent 
systems. Hence, whether licensing with per-unit output royalty increases or reduces the 
likelihood of higher ex-post welfare under weak patent protection may depend on the 
cost of reduction from R&D and the degree of knowledge spillover. 
  When cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently low (i.e.,  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ < ) then the 
effect of licensing on the R&D investment is more under strong patent protection, as 
here royalty income is higher under strong patent protection. This tends to raise the 
probability of success in R&D under strong patent protection compared to weak patent 
protection. Further, in case of unilateral success in R&D, higher royalty income under 
strong patent protection increases the summation of consumer surplus and industry 
profit in the product market. Thus, both these effects under licensing make ex-ante 
welfare more likely to be higher under strong patent protection compared to no 
licensing. But, for  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ > , royalty income is higher under weak patent protection 
compared to strong patent protection. Hence, in this situation, the effect of licensing on 
R&D investment as well as the higher summation of consumer surplus and industry 
profit in the product market increases under weak patent protection. Thus, here ex-ante 
welfare more likely to be higher under weak patent protection with licensing compared 
to no licensing. 
  The following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 11:  Consider licensing with per-unit output royalty compared to no 
licensing. For sufficiently (not sufficiently) low cost reduction from R&D (i.e., 
4
) 3 ( ) (
c a c
+ > < ), ex-ante and ex-post welfare are less (more) likely to be higher under 
weak patent protection compared to strong patent protection. 
 
  From Propositions 8 – 11, we can have following conclusion showing the 
difference of these two licensing contracts on R&D investment and social welfare. 
 
Corollary 1: Effect of licensing on R&D investment and ex-ante welfare depends on the 
type of licensing contract and if the cost reduction from R&D is moderate (i.e., 
) , ( 5
) 3 2 (
4
) 3 ( c a c a c
+ + ∈ ). Here, both higher impact of licensing on R&D investment and the 
likelihood of higher ex-ante welfare under strong (weak) patent protection is more if 




In a Cournot duopoly, we take a fresh look on the effect of different patent systems on 
R&D investments and social welfare. Further, we examine how the results are 
influenced with the existence of different types of licensing. 
  Whether strong patent protection increases R&D investment of both firms is 
ambiguous. However, R&D investment of at least one firm is higher under strong patent 
protection than weak patent protection. Thus, this paper provides a testable hypothesis 
for examining the effects of different patent systems on the firm level R&D investment. 
Without any possibility of licensing, whether ex-post welfare will be more under weak 
and strong patent protection is also ambiguous. However, in this situation, ex-ante 
welfare is likely to be higher under strong patent protection.  
If licensing contract ex-post R&D consists of up-front fixed-fee only then the 
effect of licensing on R&D investment is higher under strong patent protection 
whenever licensing is profitable under both patent systems. But, if licensing is privately 
profitable only under weak patent protection then it reduces the difference in total R&D 
investment between weak and strong patent protections. While a profitable licensing 
contract makes the ex-post welfare more likely to be higher under weak patent 
protection, the possibility of licensing makes ex-ante welfare more likely to be higher 
under strong (weak) patent protection whenever licensing is profitable under both patent 
systems (under only weak patent system).   
The results could be changed if licensing consists of per-unit output royalty only. 
Whether royalty income is higher under weak patent protection depends on the cost 
reduction from R&D as well as on the degree of knowledge spillover. While for 
sufficiently low cost reduction from R&D, the effect of this type of licensing on R&D 
investment is more under strong patent protection, the effect of licensing will be more 
under weak patent protection when cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently large and 
the degree of knowledge spillover is sufficiently small. Unlike fixed-fee licensing 
contract, ex-post welfare is likely to be higher under strong patent protection when cost 
reduction from R&D is sufficiently small, but ex-ante welfare is likely to be higher 














A   Proof of Proposition 1: (a) Taking total differential of (4) and (5), we find the 
reaction function of the ith firm either as 
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where  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c c c c c c c c G i i i i α π α π π π − − + = ,  2 , 1 , = j i  and  j i ≠ . We know that 
the denominator of (A.1) and (A.2) are negative due to the second order condition of 
maximization. Further, it is easy to check that both H  and G  are negative. Hence, the 
reaction functions are negative. Further, straightforward calculation shows that the 
absolute value of the reaction functions is less than 1. 
 
(b) The proof is by contradiction. Consider the first order conditions of these firms 
mentioned above with  ′ > ′
j i p p . Assume that in equilibrium  j i x x =  and the first order 
condition is satisfied for firm  j . Then it is easy to see that in this case the marginal 
benefit for firm i is higher than the marginal cost (i.e., the left hand side is greater than 
the right hand side for firm i). Therefore, for this value of  j x , the profit maximizing 
R&D investment will be higher for firm i. Hence, we can say that the reaction function 
of firm i will be to the right of point  j i x x =  when  j x  is on the reaction function of 
firm  j . Since, the reaction functions are negatively sloped with an unique equilibrium, 
this proves the result. 
Since, equilibrium R&D investment of firm i is more than firm  j  and 
0 > ′ > ′
j i p p , the probability of success for firm i will be more than firm  j  in 
equilibrium.                    Q.E.D. 
 
B    Proof of Proposition 3: (a) If in case of unilateral success in R&D the 
successful firm becomes a monopoly then the analysis in section 2.3.1 shows that total 
R&D investment will be same under both patent systems. Hence, here ex-post welfare  21
will be same under both patent systems irrespective of the number of firms succeed in 
the R&D. 
 
(b) If either both firms succeed or neither firm succeeds in R&D then both firms will 
operate with same marginal costs of production. Since, we consider a situation where 
the successful firm cannot be a monopoly in case of unilateral success in R&D, the 
analysis in the subsection 2.3.1 shows that here total R&D investment will be more 
under strong patent protection. Hence, here ex-post welfare will be more under weak 
patent protection. 
 
(c) From (10) we find that  
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ep W  reaches minimum at  11
) 7 4 ( c a c
+ = α . First, consider that  2
) ( c a c
+ < . 
Therefore, in this case both firms compete in the product market irrespective of the 








ep W c c W = = ) (α . Hence, we find that if  11
) 7 4 ( c a c




ep W W >  for all  ) , [ c c c∈ α . Total higher R&D investment under strong patent 
protection reinforces this effect. Therefore, welfare under weak patent protection is 
more than that of under strong patent protection for all degrees of knowledge spillover 
when cost reduction from R&D is not sufficiently large. 
Since, 
wp








ep W c c W = = ) (α , we can say that for  11
) 7 4 ( c a c
+ >  there is a 
value of α , say 
* α , such that 




ep W W >  and 




ep W W < . Total 
higher R&D investment under strong patent protection helps further to increase ex-post 
welfare under weak patent protection. Hence, we find that even if cost reduction from 
R&D is sufficiently large then ex-post welfare is higher under weak patent protection 
when knowledge spillover is sufficiently large. But, for sufficiently large cost reduction 
from R&D and sufficiently low knowledge spillover, ex-post welfare is likely to be 
higher under strong patent protection.  
Next, consider that  2
) ( c a c
+ ≥  but,  2
) ( c a c
+ < α . So, here the unsuccessful firm 
cannot compete in the market under strong patent protection but can compete under 








ep W c W = =
+ ) ( 2
) ( α . Since, 
wp
ep W is convex, quadratic and continuous over 
] , [ 2
) ( c a c c
+ ∈ α  with a minimum at  11
) 7 4 ( c a c
+ = α , we can say that weak (strong) patent  22
protection provides larger amount of consumer surplus plus industry profit in the 
product market provided degree of knowledge spillover is sufficiently large, say 
c α α ) (> < . Therefore, higher ex-post welfare is more (likely to be more) under weak 
(strong) patent protection for 
c α α ) (> < . This proves the result.      Q.E.D. 
 
C   Proof of Lemma 1: We have  
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  Direct comparison of the above expressions proves the results.   Q.E.D. 
 
D   Proof of Proposition 6: In case of licensing the average cost of production of 
the licensee will be c after licensing. Hence, the ith firm, as the licenser will maximize 
the following objective function while determining the price of the technology: 
 
 
) 1 ( )) , ( ) , ( ( )) , ( ) , ( (
β β π π π π
− − − − + z c F c c z c F c c Max j j i i
F ,  j i j i ≠ = , 2 , 1 , .            (D.1) 
 
Maximizing (D.1) we find that  )) , ( ) , ( )( 1 ( )) , ( ) , ( ( c c z c z c c c F i i j j π π β π π β − − + − = . 
Second order condition for maximization is satisfied.                        Q.E.D.  
 
E   Proof of Proposition 7: (a) First, consider a situation where licensing is optimal 
under weak patent protection but not under strong patent protection, i.e.,  5
) 3 2 ( c a c
+ < α and 
5
) 3 2 ( c a c
+ > . Therefore, here the possibility of licensing will affect the reaction functions 
under weak patent protection only. So, the equilibrium R&D investments under strong 
patent protection will be same as it was without the possibility of licensing, i.e., by the 
first order conditions (8) or (9). However, with the possibility of licensing, the net profit 
of the i th firm under weak patent protection will be 
  23
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5  and  w F  shows the licensing fee under weak patent protection. 
Therefore, the reaction function for R&D investment of the ith firm is given by 
 
) ) , ( )( ( ) ( ) ) , ( ))( ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( w i j j i i w i j j i i i j j i i F c c x p x p F c c x p x p c c x p x p − ′ − + − ′ + ′ π π π  
1 ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( = − ′ − c c x p x p i j j i i π ,     ij ,, = 12, ij ≠ .                             (E.2) 
 
So, in case of weak patent protection, both the reaction functions for R&D investment 
shift rightward under licensing compared to no licensing (compare the expressions (5) 
and (E.2)). However, like the subsection 2.3.1, it is not clear whether this possibility 
will increase the equilibrium R&D investment of both firms. If the probability functions 
are sufficiently different then the possibility of licensing will increase the equilibrium 
R&D investment of one firm only. However, we can say that total R&D investment 
under weak patent protection will be more under licensing compared to no licensing. 
Hence, given that the total R&D investment under weak patent protection increases with 
the possibility of licensing compared to no licensing, the difference in R&D investments 
between weak and strong patent protections reduces with the availability of licensing.   
 
(b) Now, we look at the situation where licensing is optimal under weak and strong 
patent protections, i.e.,  5
) 3 2 ( c a c
+ < . Following the previous argument, we can say that 
here the reaction functions of both firms shift rightward under both patent systems. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether the possibility of licensing will increase both firms’ 
R&D investment for corresponding patent system. However, from Proposition 6, it is 
clear that license fee increases as the cost difference between the licenser and licensee 
increases. This implies that the license fee will be higher under strong patent protection 
compared to weak patent protection. Since, there is a positive relationship between the 
rightward shifts of the reaction functions and the license fee, it is likely that the 
difference in total R&D investment and asymmetry in R&D investment under strong 
and weak patent protection tends to increase with the possibility of licensing.  Q.E.D. 
 
F    Proof of Proposition 10: The royalty income of the licenser will be 
3
) 2 )( ( c z a c z R
+ − − = , as with the per-unit output royalty  ) ( c z r − = , the optimal output of the 
licensee will be  3
) 2 ( c z a + − . The royalty income reaches maximum at  4




) 3 ( c a c a + + < . 
This extra gain from royalty income will encourage both firms to invest more in 
R&D, given the R&D investment of the competitor. Hence, if cost reduction from R&D  24
is sufficiently small  (i.e.,  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ < ) then royalty income will be higher under strong 
patent protection. But, for not sufficiently small cost reduction from R&D and with 
sufficiently low knowledge spillover (i.e.,  4
) 3 ( c a c
+ > α ) royalty income will be higher 
under weak patent protection. Otherwise, it depends on the cost reduction from R&D 
and the degree of knowledge spillover. Following the analysis of section 3, we can say 
that the impact on equilibrium R&D investment will be more with higher royalty 
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